In her early writings, Hélène Cixous earned recognition as the feminist proponent of a theory of gift economy that challenges the patriarchal practice of giving. Patriarchal giving, she contended, enacts the master-slave dialectic, maintaining power differentials by indemnifying and reducing the other to the one who gives. Cixous imagined an alternate practice whereby the gift incurs no debts and no death for the other, a giving without expectation of return, a generosity that enriches all who participate. More than two decades after those theoretical essays, Cixous continues to explore in her fiction the relationship to the other as mediated by gifts; however, her earlier concept of giving has been considerably modified, as a reading of two very recent novels will show. In Osnabrück, an otherwise admirable model of generosity is put in question for ignoring the debts and death that dog even the most generous relationships with the other. Extending this understanding, Le Jour où je n'étais pas là presents death and debt as non-negotiable givens and obliges us to conceive of a kind of generosity predicated simultaneously on death and on the forgetting of death.
Everything must return to the masculine. "Return": the economy is founded on a system of returns. If a man spends and is spent, it's on condition that his power returns. If a man should go out to the other, it's always done according to the Hegelian model, the model of the master-slave dialectic. (50) In such an exchange, the giver asserts and consolidates power by binding others to himself and vitiating the power of others to his own advantage. A gift always implies debt and deficiency for the recipient. As Alan Schrift points out in a recent comparative analysis of Nietzsche and Cixous, debt and guilt are conceptually linked and even linguistically linked in German (Schuld = debt; schuldig = guilty), connotations particularly transparent for Cixous, whose mother tongue is German? A gift to another bestows social obligation, personal deficit, and even moral shortfall. We might take cross-linguistic associations a step further, as did Marcel Mauss in his classic anthropological study of the gift: "Gift" is "poison" in German, and reminds us of the lethal nature of giving.' As the patriarchal economy degenerates into a struggle to keep debt, guilt, and even death on the other's side. In clear opposition, "Laugh" spurns death and diminishment, touts the "exchange that multiplies" and opens uncounted spaces for others to occupy "between the other me where one is always infinitely more than one and more than me" (263, 264) . The essay projects nothing less than exponential gains to be had all around in this alternate economy.
To suggest that Cixous has merely reified her earlier theoretical projections in the maternal character of Eve, however, is to slight the complexity of her writing and to miss the refinements to her thought over the last twenty-five years. Most certainly, Cixous still finds relationships to the other a continued focus of her thought-and one can hear echoes of the alternate economy in her description in a mid-nineties interview of the rapports of reciprocity with the other:
The other in all his or her forms gives me I. It is on the occasion of the other that I catch sight of me; or that I catch me at: reacting, choosing, refusing, accepting. It is the other who makes my portrait. . . . The other of all sorts is also of all diverse richness. The more the other is rich, the more I am rich. (Rootprints 13) 4 2
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2004] Perhaps the clearest rift between the mother and the writer (not to mention between early "theory" and subsequent "praxis") is on the issue of (the other's) death. "Laugh" boldly lays out a position: "wherever history still unfolds as the history of death, she [the generous woman] does not tread" (893) . I interpret Cixous to mean that real giving founds itself in a refusal to participate in the history of the survival of a few at the expense of many. Certainly in her relentless campaign to sustain-life wherever she sees it Eve seems to adhere to this principle. In Le Jour, published less than a year after Osnabruck, takes another look at the mother's generosity. The book hovers around questions of giving (away), giving back, and taking (away), and in so doing returns to the term faute or "fault," accurately translatable as both responsibility and failing, a more subtle version of debt. The "story" goes briefly like this: some forty years after the fact, the narrator "remembers" how she gave her baby boy, a Down's syndrome child with a serious heart condition, to her mother for adoption. The book follows the narrator's attempts to get back from her mother the story of the child and particularly of his premature death in her absence and in the custody of the mother. Even so brief a summary should raise the questions of who "owes" whom and who might have been at fault. Guilt certainly seems to frame the narrator's ambivalent search for her son's story: an imagined opening scene has the narrator furtively burying the "souvenir d'une faute" 'memory of a fault' (J 9). But as close as the narrator seems to be to an admission of guilt, she ends this preface by disclaiming personal responsibility, saying of this fault, "ce n'est pas la mienne" 'it's not mine' (J 9 Cixous's text plays with this concept of "fautif" by etymological association with "clefaut," defect or imperfection. From early on, an abandoned three-legged dog wanders in and out of the narrative. Its imperfections, like some serious crime, make it susceptible to abandonment and destruction (indeed, the mother asserts forcefully: "il faut l'abbbbattre" 'it should be kkkkilled' [j 24]). But the narrator also recognizes that its defects make the dog all the more canine, as though its very lacks constitute an essence. The text openly encourages analogies between the imperfect dog and the "imperfect" child, Georges. His lagging development, unfinished heart, and condensed lifespan highlight the frailties associated with the human condition, as though he were more essentially human. The narrator takes this one step further: if the child represents some universal aspect of his species by his incompleteness, he simultaneously represents otherness from his species. He has other-racial characteristics in the bosom of a family whose station in life, by genetic and cultural heritage, is that of the officially sanctioned other. He is both related to and isolated from them. His perfect otherness is further reflected in his relationships with others. By the grandmother's testimony, the child makes no demands on others and yet is "attachant" for all those who come in contact with him. The child's wordless practice of otherness suggests a perfect innocence, a complete lack of meanness or harm to all others, indeed, a totally engaging love of all others rather than a culpable failure. Presumably for this reason the narrator calls the child "le heros de la famille" 'the hero of the family, her "saint simple" 'simple saint' and "l'instructeur de ma foi" 'the instructor of my faith' (). 65). Georges combines radical otherness with the radical practice of generosity that Cixous would wish to embrace.
Were the child's "defauts" the only faults in the book, one could argue that Cixous has staged a return to the optimism of "Laugh": an idealized conception of otherness founded upon the inevitable lacks that make each of us uniquely other combined with an idealized conception of unmeasured and cost-free gen-erosity among others. As much as this appears to be at the heart of the book (even at the heart of some secular faith whose principles, modeled by little Georges, can be practiced), other "fautes" occupy the author's writing. The child's generosity is not so much at issue as is the grandmother's, and for once there appears to be a distinct lack of generosity on her part. First, there is Eve's failure to give (back) the story of Georges and his final moments-something that seems vaguely to be owed to the narrator. Second (J 175) . If Eve has buried the memory of Georges's death beneath that of Omi's, it doesn't constitute a deliberate evasion of selfincrimination of the baby's death. Rather, the story of Omi's death explicitly reveals Eve's failure to honor life and hence to honor otherness-something she achieves in the case of Georges. In short, she exposes almost obsessively the one transgression otherwise concealed by her great generosity.
In the very last pages, when the narrator discovers her mother's role in Georges's final illness, she maintains the distinction between the mother's repeated gesture to withhold from her loved ones: in Omi's case, Eve is "l'auteur d'une lachete" 'the author of an act of cowardice' (1 189) whereas in Georges's case, she is "heroique" (J 175), that is, unusually unsparing of self. The mother merits this epithet for having given up the generous gifts of the baby-his unconditional love and undemanding lovability-to avoid the physical pain life would eventually cost him. Equally important to the narrator, the mother gives up, or more accurately never gives at all, the story of her heroic sacrifice-made moreover in the daughter's stead. We can infer that Eve fails to give the story to her daughter because it would in its turn become a gift reinstating the cycle of debt with the daughter and thus given for self-aggrandizement. The mother's equally heroic gesture lies in her claims in the end to have forgotten the events of the child's death, or at least to have forgotten her critical part, her "gift" to her grandson.
By the logic of gift economy, forgetting one's gifts leads directly to forgetting others' debts created by those gifts. From there the span is short between forgetting others' debts and that other kind of giving we call forgiving, the other kind of don (gift) that we name pardon. Technically speaking, there is no gift in forgiving other than the gesture to obliterate the debt, to overlook the shortfall, to put an end to the cycle of exchange without once again giving. In this conception of forgiveness, not only is the debt forgotten, but the gift that incurs the other's debt is forgotten as well. The narrator cites and re-cites Omi's words, writing them as though they were the book's mantra, "donne-moi quelque chose et ne me le dis pas": let there be a gift, but let it be given unbeknownst to the receiver and unacknowledged by the giver, a generous forgiving that annuls all debts, that honors the other sans accuser, without accusing or distinguishing either donor or recipient.
"Donne-moi" may have originally been Omi's request, but Cixous uses it to define the subtle, tacit transactions between Eve and her daughter as well. Eve gives her daughter stories that should not be told, and the daughter understands that Eve does so without "wishing to wish" that they be told. One might imagine her unspoken and indirect directive to read as follows: " 'Don't tell me' that you have written these stories but 'give' them anyway.
without having recourse to the dehumanizing bonds of debt. I, in turn, release you unknowingly from the obligation to give." The narrator's writing of Eve's stories (unread, of course, by her mother) has the potential to honor her mother's unformulated request.
What is more, the stories or "secrets" about her clinic (stories that Eve insists she is giving her daughter-writer not to give) All these women accused of children, of non-children, of children not like this or that, all these guilty by definition . . . who parade through the parlor where my mother sometimes closes her eyes sometimes opens her eyes and we all secrete ruses and silences it incessantly weaves modest little cloths to try to disguise the evidence of crimes they haven't committed. (I 142) 12
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2004] ' (190) . Whether debt is incurred in the giving or taking of the child is ambiguous and immaterial. More certainly, the narrator arrests the circle of debt in order to restore ties to her mother and brother. In the second instance (in fact, the book's last sentence), the writer figuratively lets close the door of her mother's clinic in Algeria, thereby letting go the secret stories of transgression, her own included, in order to get on with life. Closing the book in this fashion suggests fairly clearly that the initial question of faute has been declared moot, the memory of faute scrupulously-in all senses of the word-buried. But even the initial image of burial can lend connotations to Cixous's concept of "forgiving": less a commitment to oblivion than a sign of respect for what is human.
In this sense, to conclude by overlooking death/debt in the very notion of forgiveness would be to miss a critical difference in the "pardon" that Cixous explores in this book. Although in its archaic sense, "pardon" does mean to forfeit what is owed (and in capital cases this means, of course, to forget the death set as the penalty), Cixous's formula of forgiveness, "donne-moi quelque chose et ne me le dis pas," doesn't entirely annul death. "Give me something," "finish me off" it says "and don't tell me." Not "I will forgive the death (yours) that you owe me" but rather "I will forgive the death (mine) that you give me." Debt and death split in the second formulation: debt disappears; death does not. As debt is removed, Cixous can re-balance the equation: neither party would dominate in this giving and forgiving of death: After all, the "giver" would also be at fault were it not for the anticipatory amnesty that pre-empts debt and guilt. And the "recipient" of this death, would hold the double status of being beholden and aggrieved, had she chosen to know in advance. The power of death that remains between these two parties is meaningful not for punishment or self-aggrandizement (in other words, the reduction of one to an other) but as an equilibrating concession to the other.
In the final analysis, we have the narrator's writing to thank that this idiosyncratic version of forgiveness that "forgets" itself in the act-"donne-moi quelque chose et ne me le dis pas" 'give me something and don't tell me'-is nevertheless not entirely forgotten. By virtue of putting the words of pre-emptive forgiveness first in Omi's mouth, then Eve's, then her own, the narrator traces this "generous" maternal history of mutual forgiveness that can't quite forget the "history of death." In this particular history, Cixous redefines the gift (don) as the death-both power over the other and failing toward the other-that stands between humans.
The pardon that she also articulates is not a gift or even an antigift but rather a recognition of that fragile life-and-death relation between one and her other. To give more or to know more would be to reengage in giving death. Ironically, the writer of Le Jour can't succeed in giving or receiving a full pardon any more than she could succeed in giving a death-less gift (her mother never entirely recognizes what takes place between herself and her 14 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2004] , Art. 7 http://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol28/iss2/7 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1585 daughter). Nevertheless the writing that Cixous freely gives to her readers comes as close as one might dare to imagining a humanly possible practice of generosity toward others. Notes 1 I would like to keep in mind that Cixous eschewed an essentialist position even in these early writings. As the author cautions more than once, "we have to be careful not to lapse smugly or blindly into an essentialist ideological interpretation" (NBW 81). 1 will keep the qualifiers "masculine" and "feminine" in quotations to make apparent Cixous's challenges to those over-simplified designations. "Patriarchal" names more accurately the practices to which Cixous imagines alternatives.
ing: the other as other to is always and constitutively on the point of turning from the unknown into the known, from the other into the same. (22) 5 Kamuf offers a reading of an event that Cixous writes about and that, for one split second, enacts a desirable encounter with the other. Cixous describes how Franz Kafka bowed to a blind man to whom he was being presented. The other man knew he had been thus recognized because Kafka's hair had lightly grazed his face in the course of this show of respect. Kamuf interprets:
[The bow] is a general address, and the respect it signifies is a function of this generality. It addresses the other as, in effect, the same as all those to whom one owes respect, regardless of any and all difference. More precisely, it acknowledges the other as other than him-or herself, as more than or greater than a contingent, finite self, and finally, it addresses its respect to no one in particular, but to a concept of the other as that to which respect is owed. (82) Works Cited
